We discuss side channel leakage from modular reduction for NIST recommended domain parameters. FIPS 186-2 has 5 recommended prime fields. These primes have a special form which is referred to as generalized Mersenne prime. These special form primes facilitate especially efficient implementation. A typical implementation of efficient modular reduction with such primes includes conditional reduction. A conditional reduction in modular reduction can constitute an information channel on the secret exponent. Several researchers have produced unified code for elliptic point addition and doubling in order to avoid a simple power analysis (SPA). However, Walter showed that SPA still be possible if Montgomery multiplication with conditional reduction is implemented within the unified code. In this paper we show SPA on the modular reduction with NIST recommended primes, combining with the unified code for elliptic point operations. As Walter stated, our results also indicate that even if the unified codes are implemented for elliptic point operations, underlying field operations should be implemented in constant time. The unified approach in itself can not be a countermeasure for side channel attacks.
Introduction
Smart cards are one of the major application fields of cryptographic algorithms, and may contain sensitive data, such as RSA private key. Some implementations of cryptographic algorithms often leak "side channel information." Side channel information includes power consumption, electromagnetic fields and timing to process. Side channel attacks, which use side channel information leaked from real implementation of cryptographic algorithms, were first introduced by Kocher [9] . Side channel attacks can be often much more powerful than mathematical cryptanalysis. Thus, many papers on side channel cryptanalysis have been published.
Modular Reduction in RSA vs. ECC
In RSA cryptosystems, the modulus n is a product of two randomly generated primes p and q. So the modulus n can not have a special form which permits fast implementation. Montgomery modular multiplication [12] , that works with any odd modulus, is a most popular method to achieve fast implementation in the RSA settings. Montgomery reduction includes, at the final step of the computation, an "extra reduction" which depends on input value. If the intermediary result of the multiplication is greater than the modulus n, an extra reduction has to be performed. The extra reduction leads differences between running times needed for various input values and gives side channel leakage [1] , [7] , [9] , [13] , [16] , [17] .
On the other hand, in the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) over a prime field F p , the modulus is a domain parameter p. Before we implement ECC, we must select elliptic curve domain parameters so as to secure against mathematical cryptanalysis. Moreover we also must select domain parameters which permit efficient implementation. These selection can be influenced by security consideration, application platform, processing speed, memory constraint and gate count. For ECC over F p , it is a popular technique to select a special form of prime p for the field order. The lower level of arithmetics in ECC over F p are modular arithmetics of modulo p. Solinas gave fast modular reduction methods for generalized Mersenne prime [15] . National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provides 5 recommended prime fields in FIPS 186-2 [2] . All the recommended elliptic curve domain parameters over F p select generalized Mersenne primes. Montgomery multiplication can also be applied to ECC over F p .
SPA on Unified Code with Modular Reduction: Walter's Result
The most commonly used algorithm for computing elliptic point multiplication is the binary method. Suppose that the doubling of a point and the addition of two different points are implemented with different formulae, these two operations may then be distinguished by simple power analysis (SPA). A unified approach [3] , [6] , [8] , [10] , which unify the standard formulae for point addition and point doubling, offers generic solutions for preventing SPA. Brier and Joye proposed a "unified code," that unifies the standard formulae for point addition and point doubling on Weierstrass form of an elliptic curve [3] . However, Walter pointed out that SPA may still be possible on the unified code [3] combining with Montgomery multiplication [12] if an extra reduction is included [18 
Modular Reduction
The exponentiation is the most expensive part in implementation of public key cryptosystems. In RSA cryptosystems and ECC over a prime field F p , modular multiplication is the dominant operation in the exponentiation. Therefore, it is very attractive to provide algorithms that allow efficient implementation of modular multiplication. Montgomery's method [12] performs modular multiplication without a division instruction which is an expensive operation in almost processors. Thus Montgomery multiplication can achieve computational speed-up and is often used in RSA cryptosystems. In the RSA settings, for security reason, the modulus n is a product of two randomly generated private primes p and q. Thus the modulus n can not have a special form.
On the other hand, in ECC over F p , the modulus is a prime number p which is a domain parameter. It is not required to select randomly generated p. It is preferred to generate p of special form to achieve very fast implementation. In this section we give a brief description of fast modular reduction with special modulus such as the generalized Mersenne prime.
Generalized Mersenne Prime
In FIPS 186-2 NIST provides 5 recommended prime fields [2] . The order of the fields are shown below. 1. Define 256-bit integers: 3. This conditional subtraction is called "extra reduction." Extra reduction should be performed depending on the inputs to the modular multiplication. The extra reduction leads differences between running times needed for various input values. Simple power attacks using this information leakage will be discussed in Sect. 4.
Define 192-bit integers:
s 0 = (c 2 , c 1 , c 0 ) s 1 = ( 0, c 3 , c 3 ) s 2 = (c 4 , c 4 , 0 ) s 3 = (c 5 , c 5 , c 5 ) 2. Return s 0 + s 1 + s 2 + s 3 mod p 192
Define 224-bit integers:
s 0 = ( c 6 , c 5 , c 4 , c 3 , c 2 , c 1 , c 0 ) s 1 = (c 10 , c 9 , c 8 , c 7 , 0, 0, 0 ) s 2 = ( 0, c 13 , c 12 , c 11 , 0, 0, 0 ) s 3 = (c 13 , c 12 , c 11 , c 10 , c 9 , c 8 , c 7 ) s 4 = ( 0, 0, 0, 0, c 13 , c 12 , c 11 ) 2. Return s 0 + s 1 + s 2 − s 3 − s 4 mod p 224s 0 = ( c 7 , c 6 , c 5 , c 4 , c 3 , c 2 , c 1 , c 0 ) s 1 = (c 15 , c 14 , c 13 , c 12 , c 11 , 0, 0, 0 ) s 2 = ( 0, c 15 , c 14 , c 13 , c 12 , 0, 0, 0 ) s 3 = (c 15 , c 14 , 0, 0, 0, c 10 , c 9 , c 8 ) s 4 = ( c 8 ,
Other Reduction Method for Modulus of Special Form
Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) also provides recommended elliptic curve domain parameters over F p [14] . Their field order p also has special forms that permit fast implementation. Their special forms include the form p = 2 t − c for some small value of c, as well as generalized Mersenne prime.
An efficient reduction method for the modulus of the form p = 2 t − c is also well known [11] . A typical implementation for such modulus may include an extra reduction. Therefore, simple power analysis, which will be discussed in Sect. 4, can be applied to the implementation of reduction with the special modulus p = 2 t − c.
Unified Code
Brier and Joye proposed unified code, that unifies the standard formulae for point addition and point doubling on Weierstrass form of an elliptic curve [3] . Unified code for projective coordinates, where a triplet (X, Y, Z) corresponds to the affine coordinates (X/Z, Y/Z) whenever Z 0, is given in Algorithm 6. The unified code can compute addition of two different points or doubling of a point with the same formulae. A unified approach offers generic solutions for preventing SPA. However, Walter pointed out that SPA may still be possible on the unified code combining with Montgomery multiplication if an extra reduction is included [18] .
Algorithm 6:
Unified point addition/doubling formula
Simple Power Analysis
In this section we discuss side channel leakage from the unified code (Algorithm 6) with fast implementation of modular reduction for NIST generalized Mersenne primes (Algorithms 1-5). We assume that the left-to-right binary method of elliptic point multiplication, shown in Algorithm 7, is used.
Algorithm 7:
Left-to-right binary method of elliptic point multiplication
end if 7. end for 8. Return R
Probability of Extra Reduction
Firstly we evaluate the probability of extra reduction by our experiments. In this evaluation we assume the following.
• The probability of extra reduction depends on the inputs a and b to the modular multiplication c ← a × b mod p. The following three cases should be considered.
• The case that a and b are distinct.
• The case that a = b.
• The case that one of a and b is a constant.
In the third case, a or b is constant, the probability of extra reduction can be evaluated depending on the value of constant.
Remark 1:
We should notice that in signature generation operation of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), the left-to-right method of elliptic point multiplication performs point addition with fixed point G, which is a base point on an elliptic curve (Step 5 of Algorithm 7). Therefore, when point addition with two different points are computed, in the first two steps of the unified code (Step 1 and 2 in Algorithm 6), modular multiplication should be performed with a constant value (x, y or z(= 1) coordinates of the base point G). Table 1 shows the probability of extra reduction in the two cases: 1) two inputs to modular multiplication are different, 2) two inputs are the same. We have carried out an experiment as follows. We generated 100,000 pairs of integers a and b (0 ≤ a, b < p), then we examined the extra reduction was performed or not. SHA-1 based pseudo random number generator described in FIPS 186-2 [2] was used for generation of integers. We can observe from Table 1 that in the case of P-192 and P-384, the probability of extra reduction is significantly large compared to other curves. As we can see from Step 2 in Algorithms 1-5, in the case of P-192, all s i should be added. In the case of P-384, relatively large number of s i should be added. So the probability can be large in these two curves. On the other hand, in the cases of P-224, P-256 and P-521, relatively small number of s i should be added. Consequently, the probability of the extra reduction should be small. P-256 has smallest probability of extra reduction in consequence of large number of s i which should be subtracted. Table 2 shows the probability of extra reduction in the case that one input to the modular multiplication is x coordinate or y coordinate of the NIST recommended base point. As in the case of random inputs, we randomly generated 100,000 integers a (0 ≤ a < p), then examined the probability.
Base Point
The value of x coordinate and y coordinate of the NIST base points are given below in hexadecimal format. Upper digits are shown because of the space limitation.
P-192:
x 192 =188da80eb03090f67cbf20eb43a18800f4f0 . . . y 192 =07192b95ffc8da78631011ed6b24cdd573f9 . . .
P-224:
x 224 =b70e0cbd6bb4bf7f321390b94a03c1d356c2 . . . y 224 =bd376388b5f723fb4c22dfe6cd4375a05a07 . . .
P-256:
x 256 =6b17d1f2e12c4247f8bce6e563a440f27703 . . . y 256 =4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce . . .
P-384:
x 384 =aa87ca22be8b05378eb1c71ef320ad746e1d . . . y 384 =3617de4a96262c6f5d9e98bf9292dc29f8f4 . . .
P-521:
x 521 =0c6858e06b70404e9cd9e3ecb662395b4429 . . . y 521 =11839296a789a3bc0045c8a5fb42c7d1bd99 . . . Table 2 that in the case of P-192, the probability of extra reduction is smaller than the case of random inputs ( Table 1 ). The reason is that the most significant digits of x and y coordinates of the base point have small value, 1 for x and 0 for y. Therefore, the most significant word (c 5 in Algorithm 1) have smaller value with high probability. Consequently, with high probability, s 0 + s 1 + s 2 + s 3 can has smaller value than p 192 .
We can observe from
On the other hand, in the case of P-224, although the most significant digits of both x and y coordinates have the value 0xb, which is relatively large, the probability of the extra reduction is small. We can notice from Algorithm 2 that the most significant word c 13 is not included in the most significant word of s 0 , s 1 and s 2 (plus terms), and is included only in the most significant word of s 3 (minus term). Consequently, the probability of extra reduction become smaller when an input to the modular reduction has large value.
We can observe the same facts as P-192 and P-224 in the curves P-256, P-384 and P-521. We will discuss SPA on the modular reduction in next section. We will show that, in the case of one of inputs to the modular multiplication is x or y coordinate of the base point, an implementation of elliptic point multiplication with unified code should be susceptive to SPA if the probability of the extra reduction is large.
We will see in the later section that, in the setting of ECDSA, the probability of the extra reduction with fixed base point strongly affects the attack, which will be described in the next section. Therefore, a theoretical analysis of the probability of the extra reduction is useful to give strict evaluation of security against the attack † .
The Attacks
Walter proposed SPA against elliptic point multiplication with the unified code and Montgomery multiplication including conditional extra reduction [18] . In this section, we will discuss SPA against dedicated fast reduction method for NIST recommended domain parameters. We assume that implementation of elliptic point multiplication is based on the following.
• Algorithms 1-5 are used for dedicated fast modular reduction for NIST recommended domain parameters. The algorithm described in Sect. 2.2 is also used for a sub-routine.
• The unified code (Algorithm 6) is used for elliptic point addition and doubling.
• The left-to-right method (Algorithm 7) is used for the elliptic point multiplication.
We also assume the model of the attacker as follows.
• The attacker has access to a device which calculates elliptic point multiplication.
• The attacker has knowledge about the implementation.
• The attacker can distinguish the conditional extra reduction in Algorithms 1-5 by monitoring power consumption during the computation of the elliptic point multiplication.
When two inputs P 0 and P 1 to elliptic point addition are the same (i.e.
, the computation of u 1 and u 2 in Step 1 of the unified code (Algorithm 6) should be identical. The computation of s 1 and s 2 ( Step 2) should also be identical. Therefore, both pairs exhibit identical behavior with respect to the occurrence of the extra reduction. It is the repeated or different behavior within the pairs which creates the handle for an attack. If the recorded behavior is different at these points, the point operation must be a point addition [18] . The attacker should guess the corresponding bit of the secret exponent to be "1" in such the case.
Example of the Attack
This section demonstrates an attack on P-192. Table 3 shows a typical example of the attack by simulation on PC. This table shows the initial few bits. k is the randomly generated secret exponent to be recovered, which is represented in binary format. "AD" denotes the sequence of point addition (A) and point doubling (D) in the left-to-right binary method of elliptic point multiplication (Algorithm 7). The symbol "*" expresses that the conditional extra reduction has been revealed during the computation of u 1 , u 2 , s 1 and s 2 . The symbol "-" expresses that the conditional extra reduction has not been revealed.
The penultimate row records difference (marked Y) within the computation of the pair (u 1 , u 2 ) and the pair (s 1 , s 2 ). In the place at marked Y, the corresponding elliptic point operation must be addition of two different points, then the attacker must guess that the corresponding bit of the secret exponent is "1." The bottom row "Recovered AD" expresses that executed elliptic point operation (A or D) has been successfully recovered (marked Y). We should notice that once a difference was observed (at the penultimate row), these must be all point addition, then point doubling must be performed on either side of a known point addition.
Remark 2:
In this simulation, the point P 1 in the unified † We have experimentally evaluated the probability of the extra reduction with three cases shown in Tables 1 and 2 . The case of modular squaring (a × a mod p) does not have a direct bearing on the attack, and is given just for your information. -*-----*-*-*-*-*-**--**-*-**---**-*-*-----****--*---**-***-*--**-***-* . . . u 2 -*----**-*-***-*-**--****-**--*****-*-----****--*--*********-********* . . . s 1 -**----*-**--***-**--*--*--*-*-**-*---*---***--*--*-**--*-----*--***-* . . . s 2 -**---*****-*******--*--*--********---*--****-**--*-**--*-*--**-****-* . . .
code (Algorithm 6) was regarded as the fixed point G in the binary method (Algorithm 7). In ECDSA, the fixed point G is the domain parameter. In a typical implementation, G is represented and is stored in affine coordinates. That is Z coordinate is always 1. In such the case, the extra reduction never be performed within the computation of u 1 and s 1 . Therefore, if the probability of the extra reduction is large, the large number of bits in the secret exponent should be recovered. As we have already mentioned, the probability of the extra reduction depends on the value of x and y coordinates.
We have a further work on a theoretical estimation of the probability of successfully recovered bits. As we have mentioned in the previous section, a theoretical analysis of the probability of the extra reduction may useful for this estimation.
Countermeasure
Even if the unified code is used for elliptic point operation, underlying modular operation should also be unified. That is, a conditional operation, which depends on the inputs, can constitute an information channel, providing the attacker with valuable information on the secret exponent.
As we have already stated, the probability of the extra reduction and the number of successfully recovered bits depend on the value of coordinates of the base point. If we can generate appropriate base point in terms of our attack, the probability of the extra reduction would be small. However, this strategy may not be an essential solution of countermeasure.
We should notice that, as Walter stated in [18] , Coron's three countermeasures against differential power analysis (DPA) [5] are insufficient. The first countermeasure: randomization of the secret exponent, can not defeat the attack when the attacker can distinguish the extra reduction from one power trace. The second countermeasure: blinding the point, and the third countermeasure: randomized projective coordinates also can not be countermeasures. Changing coordinates value may affect the probability of the extra reduction, but does not defeat the attack.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we showed SPA on the fast modular reduction with generalized Mersenne prime included in NIST recommended domain parameters, combining with the unified code for elliptic point operations. A practical cryptosystem based on an elliptic curve over F p is implemented with such a special form of prime to achieve fast implementation. A typical implementation of a dedicated modular reduction method for a special prime includes conditional extra reduction. Such the conditional operation can give side channel leakage.
When we take a unified approach to prevent simple power attacks, it is not sufficient to take into account only elliptic point operation level. Careful implementation at lower level, i.e. modular operation level, should be considered.
